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This article is an introductory report on the work of a Japanese study group whose primary aim is 
peacemaking, which it seeks by promoting a greater understanding of the long-term effects of 
their country’s traumatic experience of the Second World War. The group does not adopt a 
position of victimhood but seeks to understand the full picture of Japan’s role in the war, 
including its role as perpetrator. We came together with the shared assumption that the country’s 
inability to take responsibility for its role of the war is inextricably tied to its own traumatization. 
If this assumption is true, then the healing of Japan’s collective wounds will be the first step 
toward its taking responsibility for its role in the war. We have sought to understand how the 
impact of the collective and cultural trauma from the war has affected the Japanese psyche, 
especially the devastating experience of defeat. Numerous historical and sociological studies of 
Japan’s role in the Second World War have been published. But we believe that this multi-
disciplinary group’s work to understand, through a psychological lens, Japan’s traumatic 
experience of the war offers a unique approach to encouraging the country to reconsider its role 
in a series of devastating events in the region, and the continuing effects of those event on 





















New England Journal of Public Policy 
 
 2 
This introductory report discusses the contextual basis and rationale that informed the creation 
of a study group that seeks to promote a greater understanding of the long-term effects of Japan’s 
experience of the Second World War and the tasks that it set itself. It also presents some of the 
group’s initial findings.  
We have been prompted to report on our work, though it is still in its early stages, by the 
increasingly unstable situation in Northeast Asia, particularly in the relationships Japan has with 
China and North and South Korea. Also, we wish to draw attention to the existence of groups in 
Japan that are addressing the long-term legacy of the Second World War, especially some of its 
enduring aspects. 
This multi-disciplinary group is made up of Japanese psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social scientists, historians, and theologians as well as those whose background is 
in the arts and cultural studies. The authors of this article are the founding members and co-
convenors of the group. The first author, the only non-Japanese member, is an ethnic Chinese 
from Australia and a psychiatrist and psychoanalytic psychotherapist with an interest in the 
psychodynamics of conflict and collective trauma. Most of the ideas that are presented here have 




Japan invaded Korea in 1910, Manchuria in 1931, and China in 1937, before its simultaneous 
attacks in December 1941 on the United States at Pearl Harbor and its territories in the 
Philippines and Guam and on the British territories of Hong Kong and Malaya (and later Burma, 
Singapore, Australia, and New Guinea). With these later events, Japan initiated the Second 
World War in the Pacific, which ended soon after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 
August 1945. Japan has always called this part of the Second World War the Pacific War, and it 
will be referred to as such throughout this article.1 
The impact of the Pacific War was severe. Approximately 75 million people died during the 
Second World War; almost half of those deaths (35 million) occurred in the Pacific War. Of 
these, more than 20 million were civilians, a figure that gives some sense of the impact of the 
Second World War. China suffered the highest casualties with the loss of over 20 million, of 
whom approximately 3 million were military personnel and 7 million civilians who died as a 
result of warfare and another 10 million died from famine and disease during the war. Hundreds 
of thousands of Koreans were conscripted into the Japanese army and their loss has not been 
accurately accounted for, while approximately half a million Korean civilians were killed.2 
Japan itself had more than 2 million of its military killed (25 percent of its 8 million military 
personnel), and an estimate of almost a million of its civilians perished, including more than 
200,000 from the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Approximately 120,000 
Okinawans, a quarter of the population of the prefecture at the time, died as a result of the Battle 
of Okinawa, and most of the casualties were civilians. In a study of Japanese casualties during 
the Second World War, John Dower writes: “Sixty-six major cities . . . [were] heavily bombed, 
destroying 40 percent of these urban areas overall and rendering 30 percent of their population 
homeless. In Tokyo, the largest metropolis, 65 percent of all residencies were destroyed. In 
Osaka and Nagoya, the country’s second and third largest cities, the figures were 57 and 89 
percent.”3 
Whether or not Japan has apologized sufficiently for its role in the Second World War 
remains a source of debate. Some argue that Japan admitted its guilt by signing the San 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
 
 3 
Francisco Treaty of Peace in 1952 and that since then, Japan has admitted guilt in at least four 
official statements.4 These include an unambiguous statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi 
Murayama on the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end in 1995: 
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national 
policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful 
crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and 
suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the 
hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these 
irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and 
state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning 
for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.5 
Those who argue that Japan has sufficiently admitted guilt for its actions in the Second 
World War also point to the financial compensation of $800 million outlined in the 1965 Treaty 
of Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea.6  
Others, however, have complained about what they call Japan’s ambivalent apology, charging 
that, on one hand, the country admitted to its role but, on the other hand, sought to justify or 
minimize its role. Surveys of the general public opinion, inside and outside Japan, have pointed 
out that Germany’s apology has received greater acceptance than Japan’s.7 A Pew Research 
study in the United States found that only 1 percent of Koreans and 4 percent of Chinese, 
compared with 48 percent of Japanese, think that Japan has apologized sufficiently. The results 
of surveys within Japan, however, reflect polarized opinions.8 
We have no objective definition of, or universally agreed-on list of the criteria for, an 
“adequate” apology; what constitutes a “sufficient” or “acceptable” apology is wholly subjective. 
We often speak of “heartfelt” apologies that are demonstrated by symbolic gestures and 
supported by practical reparations. Countries that are still seeking genuinely heartfelt apologies 
from Japan watch vigilantly for any signs that negate earlier admissions of guilt. In an article in 
the Washington Post marking the seventieth anniversary of Japan’s surrender at the end of the 
Second World War, Anna Fifield assesses why its numerous apologies have not been accepted. 
She notes: “A big part of the problem stems from the fact that Japan’s official apologies have 
been partially undone by remarks—like when then-justice minister Shigeto Nagato said in 1994 
that the Nanjing massacre ‘was fabricated.’” She also emphasizes that recent governments have 
asked a United Nations special rapporteur to revise a 1996 report on wartime “comfort women.”9 
This unresolved issue continues to be a source of tension and instability in Northeast Asia, 
with sporadic outbreaks of conflict between Japan and China and North Korea, and more 
recently the outbreak of a trade war with South Korea. There is a general reluctance in Japan to 
discuss its role in the Second World War, and questions about war atrocities, such as the Rape of 
Nanking,10 are still keenly contested. 
 
Rationale 
Why Japan has been unable to take full responsibility for its role in the Second World War is 
unclear. Because the task of making collective claims, such as a national apology, is usually 
undertaken by government leaders, it is often assumed that the reason for this situation is 
political. The politics in Japan, as in any other country, have always been complex, and it is 
beyond the scope of this article to discuss them in detail. It is, however, the aim of this study 
group to discuss and debate relevant political issues as they arise.  
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For now, we would like to highlight three political reasons. The first and most commonly 
held is that the government is controlled by conservatives and nationalist sections of the society. 
This reason might seem insufficient, since both liberal and socialist Japanese governments have 
not addressed the situation. It has been suggested, however, that the ability of successive 
governments to act in the decades after the war has been influenced not only by a domestic 
agenda but also by global politics, including the Cold War, during which the liberals aligned 
with the United States, while socialists aligned with Russia and China. This deep split and 
polarization contributed to a degree of paralysis. 
The second reason for Japan’s seeming inability to take full responsibility for its role in the 
Second World War is that it is disadvantageous for Japan to accept its responsibility in terms of 
its international relations and the possible cost of reparations. But the situation cannot be 
explained by concern about financial reparations alone, since Japan has readily made financial 
reparations to Korea, though with no explicit acknowledgment of guilt. With regard to 
international relations, Japan’s position in the world would be greatly enhanced by its taking 
responsibility and would improve its relationship with the countries that it attacked and invaded, 
many of which still harbor mistrust and grievances.  
The third reason is that the shame of losing the war has been too severe to overcome and it 
has been a political and sociocultural bridge too far to cross. This third reason, the issue of 
shame, is not just a political problem. There is a view that leaders and politicians are products of 
the people who elected them, and that their policies and actions are made in response to popular 
sentiments that exist in the country. In accordance with this view, therefore, Japan’s political 
failure to take responsibility for the Second World War is a result of its people’s inability to face 
up to their own personal and collective responsibility for what happened. The question then is, 
“Why is it that the Japanese people, both as individuals and as a collective whole, have been 
unable to assume their responsibility?” This study group aims to find that answer. 
The group, initiated by two psychiatrists, began with the belief that a large part of the 
answer to this question lies in the psychology of the Japanese people. After almost a decade of 
considering this question, the authors of this article and co-conveners of the group have 
concluded that the Japanese people, as individuals and as a collective whole, are unable to be 
responsible for what happened because they have not been able to face their own massive and 
overwhelming trauma from the war and thus have to hide the total episode from their collective 
memory (with varying success).  
Throughout his engagement with professional colleagues and others in Japan during the past 
decade, Eugen Koh, the first author of this article, observed a general reluctance to discuss the 
war and, when conversations turned to that topic, an avoidance of eye contact and a downward 
gaze suggesting shame. But is it simply shame at losing the war that is preventing engagement 
with the topic? The situation, he found, is far more complex. One line of analysis begins with the 
fact that the Japanese people have not been able to face their own pain of loss and grief from the 
war; if one is unable to experience the pain of loss, one will not be able to bear the pain of shame 
and humiliation, and guilt. Exposure to the painful emotions associated with loss and grief 
arouses deep feelings of shame and guilt; such feelings would be utterly overwhelming and 
traumatic and must therefore be avoided. 
This possibility came to Dr. Koh following a conversation with a psychiatrist who led a 
bereavement service for survivors of the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami of 2011, in 
which about 20,000 people died and more than 350,000 were left homeless. He asked why it was 
that only a few survivors had sought help from his service, five years after the event. He 
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wondered whether the survivors who had lost families preferred to mourn in private, since 
Japanese are private about their emotional experiences. He also wondered, however, whether the 
real reason was that they had not mourned.  
Avoidance of or delay in mourning is commonly observed in groups that have experienced 
massive traumatic loss, such as survivors of the Holocaust and the Cambodian genocide. Many 
of these survivors did not grieve their catastrophic losses until decades later, if at all. It was 
simply too painful to mourn, especially while they were still in a survival mode of existence. 
Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich have written about a similar experience of the Germans 
after the Second World War in Europe in their classic text The Inability to Mourn.11 Kai 
Ogimoto, a member of this study group, discusses this possibility in “The Inability to Mourn in 
Japan after 1945.”12 
It seems plausible that many Japanese have avoided mourning or been unable to mourn their 
losses from the war. If such an avoidance of mourning is to be overcome, one must consider the 
psychodynamics of trauma and find ways to address the cumulative psychic pain that has 
resulted from the loss and grief caused by the war and its long-term aftereffects. Of particular 
concern is the transgenerational trauma among the descendents of those initially affected and the 
collective and cultural trauma that have been embedded into Japanese culture today. The study 
group came together to gain and then to promote an understanding of this multi-layered situation. 
 
Origin of the Study Group 
The study group emerged from more than a decade of collaboration and friendship between the 
two authors of this article. Tadashi Takeshima had been working for many years on mental 
health and suicide prevention for Japan’s policy development. He visited Melbourne, Australia, 
annually for almost a decade to study its mental health system and suicide-prevention strategies. 
He was interested in the work of the Dax Centre, a unique organization that is dedicated to the 
promotion of mental health through the use of art, and in particular its use to address the societal 
stigma of mental illness. Dr. Koh was the director of the organization for more than twelve years 
and was also the director of another organization called CASSE, which is dedicated to assisting 
organizations and communities to “create a safe and supportive environment” through 
psychodynamic understandings of conflict and violence. Dr. Takeshima’s interest in the work of 
these organizations led him to invite Dr. Koh to Japan to assist with various projects during the 
past decade. 
Dr. Koh has always maintained a clinical practice and has, over the past two decades, 
assisted individuals and communities affected by severe trauma. He has worked with Aboriginal 
communities severely traumatized by colonization, as well as survivors of the Holocaust and 
communities affected by the conflict in Northern Ireland and natural disasters (such as the 
tsunami). Since 2013, he has given up his work with the Dax Centre and CASSE and focused on 
international consulting on culture, trauma and conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. He does, 
however, have a personal interest in Japan’s role in the Second World War. His grandfather, who 
was educated in Shanghai, considered himself a Chinese patriot and played a role in securing 
funding throughout Southeast Asia to support China’s war effort against Japan in Manchuria in 
early 1930s. Dr. Koh grew up in Malaysia in the 1960s, only a couple of decades after the 
Japanese occupation of Malaya of more than three years. He can recall many stories of the 
torture and killing of ethnic Chinese. 
Despite these experiences, Drs. Koh and Takeshima have a mutually respectful relationship 
and have enjoyed regular frank and open discussions about the war, over many years of fruitful 
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collaboration. The worsening instability of the world, including the increasing political tension in 
Northeast Asia in recent years, prompted them to put together this broad multidisciplinary group. 
(The names and respective areas of interest and expertise of the other members of the study 
group are listed in the Appendix. We are hoping that a few more experts from the field of history 
and social and political science will join the group soon.) 
 
Objectives of the Study Group 
The aim of the group is to promote peacemaking by increasing understanding of Japan’s long-
term legacy from the Second World War and the implications of this legacy for peace today. Of 
particular consideration are Japan’s inability to take responsibility for its role in initiating 
conflict and for its conduct during the war. 
To achieve its overall aim, the group is set to address the following questions: 
1. What were the historical, sociocultural, and political factors that led Japan to attack the 
United States and countries in Asia and to initiate the Second World War in the Pacific? 
2. What was Japan’s role during the war and what claims have been made about Japan’s 
conduct during the war? 
3. What was the impact of the war on Japan itself and, in particular, on its civilians and 
sociocultural life? 
4. What was the impact on Japanese society of the seven-year US occupation after the war 
and what is its legacy today? 
5. What happened to Japan’s society and sociocultural life from the end of the war to the 
present day? 
6. What are the long-term transgenerational psychosocial effects of Japan’s experience of 
the war? 
7. What are the factors that contribute to Japan’s continuing inability to accept 
responsibility for its role as the perpetrator/aggressor in the war? 
8. What can be done to bring healing to the historic trauma resulting from the war? 
Although the primary lens through which the group will investigate these questions is 
psychological, we will also incorporate important insights from other disciplines and 
frameworks, including history, social and political science, and cultural studies and the arts. Only 
through such a broad multidisciplinary approach can we establish a sufficiently rich and detailed 
understanding of this complex situation to accurately inform a psychological analysis. 
The study group recognizes that the understanding gained from this research might also 
benefit individuals and communities who are still suffering the effects of the war, in Japan and 
elsewhere. For example, a deeper understanding of what happened during the war and why Japan 
started it will help the survivors to better process their traumatic experiences. Descendents of 
those killed during the war, soldiers and civilians alike, will be better able to bring closure to an 
unresolved (and often unspoken) wound, three generations later. 
 
Method and Process 
Recognizing that some residue of trauma from Japan’s past may linger in some members of the 
group, we have adopted an approach in our work together that involves respectful dialogue and 
mutual support. Even when the issues under discussion focus on the actions of Japan as a nation, 
with the exception of Dr. Koh, we cannot escape the reality of our being Japanese and thus 
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identifying at some level (even unconsciously) with the actions of their forebears and their 
country. 
One of the effects of trauma is shame and humiliation. As the group seeks to engage with 
the traumatic history of Japan, we are vulnerable to the experience of shame and humiliation. 
This experience is threefold. First, there is the shame one feels on behalf of one’s own country, 
as much as one identifies with one’s country. It is much like the shame one feels when the sports 
team one supports loses. Second, there is the shame one feels because of a direct connection to a 
shameful act; for example, one can feel ashamed on discovering one’s ancestors did something 
shameful. Third, there is the shame that comes from avoidance; one can feel ashamed for lacking 
the courage to face the reality and truth of a situation. 
Shame can be intensified by exposure to the presence and judgment of others, especially 
others who are different and who might be seen as outsiders. Dr. Koh is very aware of being “an 
outsider” to his Japanese colleagues, even though he is very much a part of the group. His 
presence, however, risks heightening any experience of shame among the Japanese group 
members; thus, he seeks to be vigilant and to respond with care. 
As an outsider, Dr. Koh, who, as a founding member and co-convenor of the group 
necessarily has a central role, is free to question and highlight issues that his Japanese colleagues 
might avoid through fear of unconscious collusion. Anticipating and exploring the many other 
possible aspects of group dynamics is beyond the scope of this article, particularly at this early 
stage.  
One of the key tasks of the group is to link and integrate what has happened (and is still 
happening) in the real and complex world of politics and broader sociocultural life with what is 
known from focused research and theories. The group is vigilant about the limitations of 
applying theory to real and complex situations, especially when it comes to the application of 
psychodynamic principles to individual and collective lives. 
 
Five-Year Project and Beyond 
It is said that the work of peacemaking is never finished. It could also be said that the task of 
understanding the reason for war and the comprehension of its long-lasting effects is likely to 
extend over many lifetimes. Confucius said that a journey of a thousand miles begins with a 
single step. While the group is daunted by the enormity of the task ahead, we take comfort in 
having taken the first step in our work of peacemaking by developing the goodwill and 
collaboration across the divide between our Japanese and Chinese identities. We hope that in the 
future our colleagues from China, North Korea, and South Korea will join our effort. 
To break this enormous task into manageable parts, we have set ourselves a five-year project 
that consists of twice-yearly meetings where research findings are presented and issues are 
discussed and debated; an international symposium involving thirty to forty researchers and 
others who are working in peacemaking, within two years; publication of the proceedings of the 
symposium in English and Japanese; a conference for researchers, peacemakers, politicians, and 
the leaders of various social and cultural groups toward the end of the fifth year; and strategic 
dissemination of the research findings to encourage greater interest and participation among 
other researchers and increase awareness of the issues in the broader community. 
This is a short and ambitious time frame; it is likely that the necessary work will take at least 
twice as long. We have set this limited time frame to maintain a certain focus and momentum. 
Our mindfulness that this important work could extend beyond our lifetimes has led us to include 
younger researchers and leaders in this project. 
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Some Early Findings 
Collecting Research from Other Sources 
Soon after we came together we identified other researchers who have been working on the same 
issues we have. Among their published accounts are the histories Even So, Japan Chose a War 
by Yoko Kato and Japanese Demobilisation in the Process of Japan Empire Falling Down by 
Hiroshi Masuda, and the excellent sociological account The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, 
Memory, and Identity in Japan by Akiko Hashimoto.13 
Works by psychoanalysts include “Contemporary Manifestations of the Social Unconscious 
in Japan: Post-Trauma Massification and Difficulties in Identity Formation after the Second 
World War” and “Trauma, Shame, Guilt, and the Social Unconscious in Japan” by Kaoru 
Nishimura; “Transgenerational Transmission of Atomic-Bomb Trauma: Denial, Dependency, 
and Splitting” by Kai Ogimoto; and “The Japanese Contribution to Violence in the World: The 
Kamikaze Attacks in World War II” by Shigeyuki Mori.14  
We are confident that there are more relevant research studies that should be added to this 
body of knowledge and integrated through a psychological lens, and so we invite other 
researchers to contact the group to share their work with it. One of the aims of this study group is 
to bring together researchers who have worked on these sensitive topics in relative isolation and 
introduce them to a broader audience. An important task will be to integrate what each 
researcher brings into a comprehensive whole. By establishing a fuller picture, we hope to better 
understand what happened then, why it happened, and, generations later, what is happening now. 
 
Studying the Effects of Trauma 
At our first meeting, in Osaka on June 25, 2019, Dr. Koh presented a framework to consider the 
long-term psychosocial effects of Japan’s traumatic experience of the Second World War. The 
framework begins by highlighting the limitations of the present understanding of trauma that was 
developed from the medical paradigm of disease and disorder and the dominance of the concept 
of PTSD. It then proposes a broader concept of trauma that focuses not only on the event or the 
effect but on the experience of the individual or the collective. The framework defines trauma as 
a system’s experience of a distorted or diminished capacity to process or make sense of a 
situation; the “system” in the individual is the mind, and for the collective, it is the social 
conscious and unconscious, or more simply, its culture.  
The long-term effects of a traumatic experience can be considered from the perspectives of 
individual and collective psychologies. When the long-term traumatic effects on individuals are 
considered across several generations the impact has been conceptualized as transgenerational 
trauma.15 The impact on a collective such as a community or society across generations, in this 
instance, more than seventy-five years, has been conceptualized as cultural trauma. In other 
words, the collective consciousness that carries the trauma from one generation to another is its 
culture. 
At our second meeting, in Tokyo on September 20, 2019, Dr. Koh elaborated further on this 
distinction between transgenerational trauma and cultural trauma, presenting a recently 
developed understanding of culture from a psychological perspective. The word “culture,” which 
originated from the Latin cultura, was first documented in the writing of a Roman philosopher 
and statesman in 45 BC, in an agricultural metaphor describing culture as like the soil that holds 
and nourishes a plant. If one were to consider a grapevine, for example, the qualities of the soil 
influence the growth and character of the vine and its grapes. Dr. Koh presented two models of 
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cultural trauma: the first, proposed by Jeffery Alexander and colleagues, considers trauma as 
defined events that influence a collective’s identity16; the second, proposed by Dr. Koh, regards 
trauma as a process that distorts, compromises, and even destroys a collective’s ability to make 
sense of shared experiences. 17  This model was developed out of an appreciation of the 
devastating impact of colonization on the culture of Australian Aboriginals. 
 
Confronting Japan’s Role as Perpetrator 
Responding to an unsettling tension within the group between a desire to address the subject of 
Japan’s role as a perpetrator of the Second World War in the Pacific and a more general 
tendency to ignore it, Dr. Koh expressed the following reservations: while there was obviously a 
need to address the issue of Japan’s role as a perpetrator and the impact of its aggression, there 
was a risk that the group would become stuck in that complex and difficult emotional space, 
unable to see the bigger picture, the broader context of the war. The group agreed that to 
establish a fuller understanding of Japan’s experience of the war, we needed to consider the 
broader historical, sociological, and political context that led the country to war. But we also 
needed to recognize the risk of being caught in the perpetrator-victim paradigm that so 
commonly besets any consideration of trauma, whether individual or collective. It is not 
uncommon for perpetrators to claim victimhood. 
The group seemed to agree to explore the issue more broadly, bringing up from time to time 
Japan’s role as perpetrator. But there seemed also to have been an unspoken understanding that 
the group as a whole had not yet reached the level of mutual trust, respect, empathy, and 
maturity necessary to address this difficult topic. 
Although we considered many important issues related to the Second World War, such as 
the experience of veterans and orphans after the war, the interest of current generations in 
historical evidence of Japanese occupation across the Pacific and South East Asia, and cultural 
manifestations of residues from that period, the discussion often returned to that unanswered 
question: “Why did Japan choose war?” 
 
Examining the History of Japan’s Cultural Trauma 
One member of the group suggested that the cultural trauma that finally led to Japan’s aggression 
overseas can be traced to the Meiji Restoration, the restoration of the emperor, in 1868, which 
toppled the shogunate and brought an end to the Edo era.18 The ending of the Edo era was 
accompanied by the end of the centuries-old feudal system and the samurai culture. The 
significance of the changes brought on by the Meiji Restoration can be appreciated only if they 
are considered in the light of the ending of the 250-year Edo era, during which Japan was 
relatively isolated from the rest of the world.19  
During this period of isolation Japan developed and refined a culture dominated by the 
bushido culture of the samurai and the refinement of Zen Buddhism that is now known to the 
world as “traditionally Japanese.” The culture that developed, however, was self-referential and 
did not equip Japan for its forced encounter with Western culture that began in 1853 when 
Western countries, led by United States and the force of its navy, under the command of 
Commodore Matthew Perry, coerced Japan into trade and thus to open to the people and cultures 
from these countries.  
From the Japanese perspective, the action amounted to colonization, and a major part of it 
was cultural colonization. It was traumatic and shameful. Some historians have highlighted 
another aspect of shame from this encounter with the West: Japan came to see that, by 
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comparison, it was underdeveloped economically and technologically. This realization led to a 
frantic effort at modernization. 
Other members of the group have argued that the history related to the Meiji Restoration and 
its role in Japan’s subsequent modernization and militarization has a political dimension. Some 
point to revolutionary forces consisting mainly of the extremists of Satsuma Domain and 
Changzhou Domain, which encouraged the emperor to modernize and establish military power 
in order to overthrow the shogunate. They argue that this period of the centralization of the 
emperor’s power and its militarization was a crucial step in Japan’s path to war. 
The period of the Meiji Restoration, however, was not just one of political turmoil; it was 
associated with the enormous cultural upheaval that came with the abrupt end of the Edo era and 
the shame and humiliation of a largely cultural and economic colonization. The extent to which 
the people of Japan felt colonized, however, remains a source of debate. 
 
Examining Japan’s History from a Psychological Perspective 
From a psychological perspective, Japan’s path to war may be considered a response to the 
shame and humiliation it experienced as a result of its “colonization” and how it compared itself 
with the modern Western countries. It responded by attempting to become a new country, like its 
colonizers, rather than remaining like the old Japan that was colonized. By invading its 
neighbors (Taiwan in 1874 and 1895, Korea in 1910, Manchuria in 1931, and China in 1937), 
Japan can be said, in psychoanalytic terms, to have identified with its aggressors. Some members 
of the study group, however, prefer to understand these invasions as Japan’s choosing to be a 
colonizer simply to negate the reality of being colonized. 
The effort to understand and explain why Japan went to war left the group members with the 
uneasy feeling that our effort could be seen as an attempt to find an excuse for our country’s role 
as a perpetrator. The charge that an excuse is sought often follows whenever efforts are made to 
understand a perpetrator’s position. The common and overwhelming response to wrongdoing is 
usually one of judgment rather than understanding; the judgment is often simplistic, black and 
white. In such a binary world, there are only perpetrators and victims, those who did wrong and 
those who were wronged, those who should be punished and those who deserve compensation. 
In that world there are no gray zones or ambiguities and no opportunity for a nuanced 
understanding of all the complexities around a situation. 
The strategy that our study group is trying to adopt is to examine the whole situation in all 
its complexity and to withhold judgment (though not remove it altogether) until a substantial 
understanding of the problem has been reached. It is not easy to withhold judgment when a 
situation involves unimaginable human suffering. The usual course among those who have 
suffered at the hands of others is to feel hatred, to harbor grievances, and to seek vengeance. But, 
we believe, to make peace at such a time requires us to have the strength and courage to withhold 
judgment in order to understand things more clearly.  
 
Appendix: Members of the Group 
In addition to the co-conveners, Dr. Eugen Koh and Dr. Tadashi Takeshima, the study group 
includes the following members: 
Ryoji Aritsuka is a highly respected psychiatrist who documented late-onset post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) among survivors of the Pacific War in Okinawa. He has been working in 
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Fukushima since the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami of 2011, assisting survivors of the 
natural disaster and ensuing nuclear accident.  
Kenta Awazu, a sociologist of religion at the Institute of Grief, Sophia University, Tokyo, has 
studied the emergence of the ritual of “a minute’s silence” in Europe since the First World War 
and Japan’s adoption of this practice. 
Nobuko Fuji is a former professor of psychology at Ritsumeikan University. She is a 
psychologist, psychotherapist, and group psychotherapist who has established many support 
groups for professionals who worked in the aftermath of disasters. 
Kenji Kawano has developed and conducted research on school suicide-prevention education 
programs from the perspective of community psychology. He has also conducted qualitative 
psychological research on postvention for people bereaved by suicide. 
Eriko Koga is an associate professor of human sciences at Osaka University of Economics, 
Japan. She is a clinical psychologist and group psychotherapist who has worked in a psychiatric 
hospital for almost thirty years; she has a special interest in therapeutic communities. 
Shiguyeki Mori is a professor of psychology at Konan University and a clinical psychologist, 
psychoanalyst, and trauma-focused psychotherapist who has also researched Japanese war 
children (Kriegskind) in collaboration with German psychoanalysts and published on Japan’s 
role in the war. 
Toshie Mori, whose background is in cultural cinema studies, has a particular interest in 
Japanese films related to the war and the role of anime characters in portraying aspects of 
Japanese culture. 
Kuniko Muramoto is professor of psychology at Ritsumeikan University and a clinical 
psychologist who has worked with traumatized women and children. She has a special interest in 
multigenerational trauma caused by war and disaster. 
Eri Nakamura is a post-doctoral research fellow at Keio University and a historian of war, 
medicine, and masculinity in modern Japan. She has published on war neurosis and Japanese 
military psychiatry during the Pacific War.  
Akira Nishimura is an associate professor of the University of Tokyo, specializing in religious 
studies. He is chair of the Society of Sociology of Warfare. 
Kaoru Nishimura is a senior associate professor of psychology at International Christian 
University in Tokyo. He is a psychologist, psychotherapist, and group psychotherapist and has 
engaged in the research of the “social unconscious.”  
Ryota Nishino, whose background is in social and cultural history, has published on Japan’s 
representation of war memories through travel writing about sites of war in the Pacific. He is 
currently working on Japanese representations of the war in memoirs and films and 
documentaries. 
Tetsuro Noda is a professor of psychiatry who has conducted research on the trauma of natural 
disaster victims since the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Kobe in 1995. His research 
interests include measures of trauma prevention for Japan Self-Defense Forces personnel. 
Kai Ogimoto is a clinical psychologist and psychotherapist. He is interested in the 
transgenerational transmission of trauma and guilt in Japan. He presented a paper titled “The 
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Inability to Mourn in Japan after 1945” at the 51st Congress of the International 
Psychoanalytical Association in 2019. 
Mayumi Oka, a graduate in French literature, is an associate professor at the Graduate School of 
Health Management, Keio University. In 1995, she joined the Asian Women’s Fund under the 
jurisdiction of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was involved in interviews of war victims 
in Asian countries. 
Yoshiro Okajima is a professor of psychiatry at Saitama Medical Center, Jichi Medical 
University. He is a psychiatrist and group psychotherapist and is engaged in educational 
activities for group psychotherapy. 
Richard Okuno, a graduate of Stanford and Harvard Universities, is an independent management 
consultant based in Tokyo with thirty years of international experience in the global financial 
services industry. 
Tomomi Sakamoto is an academic social worker at Japan College of Social Work who has 
undertaken research on children orphaned by the war. 
Hisashi Sasaki is a member of the editorial board of Kyodo News, a leading news agency in 
Japan with a significant outreach into Asia. His father went to China as a soldier, and his uncle 
was detained and died in Siberia. 
Yuri Seki is a counselor in the Health Centre at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo. She is a 
psychologist and a group analytic psychotherapist. She is engaged in the research on group 
analysis and Japanese culture. 
Susumu Shimazono, a professor of religion and director of the Institute of Grief at Sophia 
University, Tokyo, is one of the foremost experts in the formation of new religions and has 
documented the emergence of new religions and spiritual groups in Japan since the Second 
World War. He played a major role in leading the multifaith response to the spiritual needs that 
arose during the recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami of 2011. 
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